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The Defensive Use of Collateral




In the recent case of Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,' the
Supreme Court held that offensive use of collateral estoppel -
whereby a plaintiff seeks "to estop a defendant from relitigating the
issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against an-
other plaintiff' ' - 2 may be appropriate when a trial court in its dis-
cretion finds that application of the doctrine would be fair. Aside
from the profound effect this ruling has on the emerging doctrine of
offensive collateral estoppel, Parklane has broader implications on
the standards for applying defensive collateral estoppel when mutu-
ality of parties is lacking. The Court in Blonder-Tongue Laborato-
ries, Inc. v. University of Illinois Foundation,3 left to "the trial courts'
sense of justice and equity" the formula for'applying this doctrine,
which estops a plaintiff "from asserting a claim that the plaintiff had
previously litigated and lost against another defendant."' Parklane
offers considerable guidance in determining what factors weigh in
making a "just and equitable" decision in the use of defensive collat-
eral estoppel when no mutuality is present.5
* B.S. 1975, Oregon State University, J.D. 1978, Syracuse University School of Law;
Member of Florida Bar, Law Clerk to the United States District Court, S.D. Fla.
The conclusions expressed in this article are those of the author and are not, nor are they
intended to be, the views of the court.
I. 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979).
2. Id at 650.
3. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
4. Id at 334.
5. In discarding the mutuality rule for patent infringement actions, the Court in
Blonder-Tongue overruled the earlier case of Triplett v. Lowell, 297 U.S. 638 (1936), stating,
We are not persuaded, therefore that the Tri#et rule as it was formulated, is essen-
tial to effectuate the purposes of the patent system or is an indispensible or even an
effective safeguard against faulty trials and judgments. Whatever legitimate concern
In a multidistrict litigation setting, a transferee judge sitting for
consolidated pretrial proceedings pursuant to a section 1407 trans-
fer6 by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,7 may now be
able to hear consolidated cases on the merits in situations in which
he was previously unable. Ordinarily, if a transferee judge presiding
over such consolidated pretrial proceedings wanted to hear consoli-
dated cases on the merits, he would have to be located in a district
where the cases "might have been brought" before he could transfer
venue under section 1404(a).8 In the common single plaintiff-multi-
ple defendant complex lawsuit, however, there is often no one proper
forum to which all the cases can be transferred under that section for
consolidated trial on the merits. Moreover, defendants are not en-
couraged to consolidate voluntarily because they can adopt a "wait
and see" approach: since the defendants were not all parties to a
single action, due process prevents the plaintiff from asserting collat-
eral estoppel against them in their ongoing separate litigation.9 Yet,
there may be about the intricacies of some patent suits, it is insufficient in and of itself
to justify patentees relitigating validity issues as long as new defendants are available.
This is especially true if the court in the second litigation must decide in a principled
way whether or not it is just and equitable to allow the plea of estoppel in the case
before it.
Id at 334.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (1976) provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
When civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact are pending in
different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings. Such transfers shall be made by the judicial panel
on multidistrict litigation authorized by this section upon its determination that
transfers for such proceedings will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses
and will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions. Each action so trans-
ferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial
proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been
previously terminated: Provided, however, That the panel may separate any claim,
cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and remand any of such claims
before the remainder of the action is remanded.
The remaining subsections of the statute deal with procedural matters, rule-making authority
for the panel and limitations on the types of cases that may be transferred.
7. For a historical overview and analysis of the workings of the Panel, see Calm, 4 Look
at the Judicil Panel on Mulidaric Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 211 (1976).
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976) provides, "For the convenience of parties and witnesses,
in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or
division where it might have been brought."
Although it is true that a transferee judge must be located in a district or division where
the action might have been brought originally before he can transfer venue of the case to his
court under § 1404(a), a transferee judge can avoid the hardships of § 1404(a) by being as-
signed or designated, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1976), to a district or division where venue
is proper. The importance of a § 292 designation in multidistrict litigation is discussed in the
text accompanying notes 104-106 infra.
9. In Blonder-Tongue, Justice White speaking for a unanimous court, reiterated the re-
quirements of due process as they apply to collateral estoppel:
Some litigants - they who never appeared in a prior action - may not be collaterally
estopped without litigating the issue. They have never had the chance to present
their evidence and arguments in the claim. Due process prohibits estopping them
despite one or more existing adjudications of the identical issue which stand squarely
against their position.
402 U.S. at 329. The Court also notes this in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. at 649
n.7.
defensive collateral estoppel theoretically would be available against
the opposing plaintiff under Blonder-Tongue, if he failed to prevail
on the merits against any of the defendants. After Parklane, how-
ever, defensive collateral estoppel may not always be available to
defendants who "wait and see" instead of joining the original suit.
In certain complex multidistrict cases, the use of the doctrine may
undermine the basic policy reasons for allowing collateral estoppel
as expressed by the Court in Parklane. The refusal of a transferee or
transferor court to allow the assertion of collateral estoppel in a sub-
sequent action may, in effect, encourage the defendants to consoli-
date before the transferee judge, through the device of a declaratory
judgment action, for a trial on the merits. This procedure would al-
low a court to avoid the problems of waste of judicial resources and
unfairness that the Court in Parklane declared as the central under-
lying policy for application of the doctrine.' 0
Whether the practice of a section 1407 judge transferring the
cases to himself is a sound one has been widely debated. " I Arguably,
certain considerations might mitigate against this practice, yet the
massive nature of many multidistrict cases makes consolidation for
trial on the merits peculiarly appealing in many instances.' 2 The
Parklane decision may present a judge another tool for effectuating
such a consolidated proceeding in a situation in which he was here-
tofore unable because proper section 1404(a) venue was unavailable.
II. Parklane: Culmination of a Trend Away from Mutuality
The Parklane case should be viewed as the final step in a trend
away from the common-law rule requiring mutuality of parties for
the application of collateral estoppel. Traditionally, the rule re-
quired both identical issues and parties,' a or those in privity with
them,"4 before the defensive use of collateral estoppel could be as-
10. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645, 650 (1979).
11. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, 15 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION §§ 3866-3867 (1976) [herein-
after referred to as C. WRIGHT], Speiser, Multidistrict Ltigation in Air Crash Cases, CASE &
COMMENT (July-Aug. 1974); Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litiga-
tion, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1017-28 (1974); Comment, Consideration of Pre-trial Proceedings
Under Proposed Section 1407 of the Judicial Code- Unanswered Questions of Transfer and Re-
'iew, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 558, 561 (1966).
12. This problem is discussed in Part Il1(C) infra.
13. The leading case in support of the traditional rule is Bigelow v. Old Dominion Cop-
per Min. & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127 (1912), in which the Court stated, "It is a principal
of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be mutual." Later in that
opinion, the Supreme Court restated the rule: "There can be no estoppel arising out of a judg-
ment, unless the same parties have had their day in court touching the matter litigated, and
unless the judgment is equally available to both parties." Id at 131.
14. The Court in Bigelow also recognized that the rule applied to those in privity. Id at
128-29. The Bigelow case is cited in a footnote by the Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,
99 S. Ct. 645, 649 n. 6 (1979). Restatement (First) of Judgments, § 93, comment d (1942), sup-
serted. I5 Once these two elements were present, and a final adjudi-
cation on the merits entered, the Court embarked on a second level
of analysis: the person against whom estoppel was asserted had to
show that he did not have a "full and fair opportunity" to pursue his
claim in the first action.
16
The leading case abrogating the mutuality requirement was
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association. 7
The Supreme Court of California, in a sweeping opinion by Justice
Traynor, cast aside the traditional rule with the following oft-quoted
statement:
No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the require-
ment of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a
previous action should be precluded from asserting it as res judi-
cata against a party who was bound by it is difficult to compre-
hend.'5
ports this rule. For a complete discussion of the traditional rule, see Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044,
1059 (1970).
15. Courts have distinguished between offensive and defensive collateral estoppel in ap-
plying the mutuality requirement. Many courts that have accepted the abandonment of mutu-
ality for defensive collateral estoppel have been reluctant to embrace such a rule for offensive
collateral estoppel. See the discussion in Adamson v. Hill, 202 Kan. 482, 449 P.2d 536 (1969),
in which the Supreme Court of Kansas noted that despite the broad language of Justice Tray-
nor in Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892
(1942),
In actual practice ... it for the most part has been used defensively by one not a
party to the first action against one who was a party to the first action and had his day
in court upon the issues which the judgment decided, rather than applied affirma-
tively. . . in favor of a nonparty to the previous litigation ....
Id. at -, 449 P.2d at 540 (emphasis in original). The court in Adamson refused to abandon the
mutuality rule in that case. Various cases are collected in Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1068
(1970).
The distinction between the requirement of mutuality in offensive use of collateral estop-
pel and defensive use of collateral estoppel was extensively discussed by the Court in Parklane.
99 S. Ct. at 650-51. These distinctions are analyzed in Part IV infra.
16. In Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313,
333 (1971), the Court indicated that an onerous burden existed on the patentee to prove "that
the prior proceedings were seriously defective." Id at 333. For a discussion of the "full and
fair opportunity" litigation requirement, see Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 515 F.2d 964 (5th Cir. 1975). The court in Kaiser found that such an opportunity ex-
isted in the prior action, and that collateral estoppel properly should have been applied. Id at
987. The court significantly stated that the words "justice and equity" used by the Court in
Blonder-Tongue were not "independent grounds" for denying the use of collateral estoppel,
"and that a determination whether such independent ground exists" did not rest in the trial
court's discretion:
The phrase indicates that each case merits individual consideration before a district
court rules on an estoppel plea and, possibly, that other extraordinary grounds, not
expressly mentioned, may provide the necessary foundation for denying a collateral
estoppel defense in individual cases.
* * , We cannot acquiesce to a meaning of the words, "justice and equity" that
would permit unarticulated and unreviewable determinations when a district court
refuses a plea of collateral estoppel in patent litigation.
515 F.2d at 978. See also Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron Inc., 403 F. Supp.
1040 (S.D. Ohio 1975), afd, 562 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1977).
17. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
18. Id. at 812, 122 P.2d at 895. This statement was cited by the Supreme Court in Park-
lane, 99 S. Ct. at 649 n. 8. For a discussion of the historical and practical significance of the
Bernhard case, see Currie, Civil Procedure.- The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25 (1965)
(wherein Professor Currie reassessed his earlier reservations with the Bernhard doctrine and its
Many state and lower federal courts followed the Bernhard rationale
and abandoned the mutuality principle in the use of offensive,' 9 as
well as defensive, collateral estoppel.2" The Supreme Court, how-
ever, was silent until Blonder- Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University
ofIllinois Foundation,I' decided in 1971. In abandoning the mutual-
ity requirement where a patentee sought to relitigate the validity of a
patent already declared invalid by another court in a previous ac-
tion, the majority in Blonder-Tongue overruled the case of Trplett v.
Lowell,22 which had stood for nearly thirty-five years.
While directing his initial discussion to the general trend away
from the mutuality rule, Justice White, speaking for the majority,
clearly tempered his remarks by stating,
These mutations in estoppel doctrine are not before us for whole-
sale approval or rejection. But at the very least they counsel us to
re-examine whether mutuality of estoppel is a viable rule where a
patentee seeks to relitigate the validity of a patent once a federal
court has declared it to be invalid.23
Despite the Court's disclaimer, however, the general tenor of the
opinion was interpreted broadly.24 When lower courts read Justice
White's broad language relating to "a trial court's sense of justice
and equity" 5 in conjunction with Jeremy Bentham's description of
the doctrine as "destitute of any semblance of reason"26 and as "a
maxim which one would supposed to have found its way from the
gaming table to the bench,"27 they interpreted Blonder-Tongue as
progeny); Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel- Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L.
REV. 281 (1957); and Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1069-70 (1970).
19. See, e.g., Zdanok v. Glidden Co., Durkee Famous Food Div., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964); BR. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596,
225 N.E.2d 195 (1967); and the cases collected at Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1074 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Davis v. McKinnon & Mooney, 266 F.2d 870 (6th Cir. 1959); and the cases
collected at Annot., 31 A.L.R.3d 1044, 1072 (1970).
21. 402 U.S. 313 (1971).
22. 297 U.S. 638 (1936).
23. 402 U.S. at 327.
24. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67, 73 (4th Cir. 1976):
Since the validity re? non of the Conover patent was not directly in issue in the pro-
ceedings before the Commission or in the court below, the precise wording of
Blonder-Tongue is not dispositive of the question raised by the plaintiff's motion.
This is of little moment, however, since the plaintiff's motion should properly be
considered in the light of the fundamental changes and developments in te doctrine
of collateral estoppel which were thoroughly reviewed and analyzed by Mr. Justice
White in his opinion in Blonder-Tongue.
Id
In Poster Exchange, Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117, 122 (5th Cir. 1975),
the court in an antitrust action found the use of collateral estoppel appropriate in that case,
and citing Blonder-Tongue, stated that the trend in abrogating the mutuality requirement "has
been smiled upon by the Supreme Court."
25. 402 U.S. at 334.
26. 3 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 519 (1827) reprinted in 7 WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843) quoted at 402 U.S. at 323. This quote was
also noted by Judge Friendly in Zdanok v. Gliddon Co., Durkee Famous Food Div., 327 F.2d
944, 954 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
27. 3 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 519 (1827) reprinted in 7 WORKS
OF JEREMY BENTHAM 171 (J. Bowring ed. 1843) quoted at 402 U.S. at 334.
having wider applicability than just to patent validity actions.28
Then in Parklane the Supreme Court allowed the use of offen-
sive collateral estoppel when to do so would be fair, and left the
decision to a trial court's "broad discretion. ' 29 In distinguishing be-
tween defensive and offensive collateral estoppel, the Court cited the
underlying policy considerations that make defensive use of the doc-
trine generally appropriate, when offensive use is not. Defensive use
"precludes a plaintiff from relitigating identical issues," but offensive
use encourages a "'wait and see' attitude in the hope that the first
action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment. 3 °
Thus, defensive use decreases the amount of litigation, whereas of-
fensive use is likely to increase it.3 ' Moreover, offensive use may be
unfair to the defendant. If the first suit is for nominal damages, the
defendant "may have little incentive to defend vigorously, particu-
larly if future suits are not foreseeable. '3 2 Application of the doc-
trine would also be unfair if the judgment relied on as a basis for
estopping the defendant is "inconsistent with one or more previous
judgments,"33 or if the "second action affords the defendant proce-
dural opportunities unavailable in the first action that could readily
cause a different result."'
Thus, the Court concluded that trial courts should be given
"broad discretion to determine when [the doctrine] should be ap-
plied."' 35 The Court stated the general rule of fairness in the grant or
denial of collateral estoppel as follows:
The general rule should be that in cases where a plaintiff could
easily have joined in the earlier action or where, either for reasons
discussed above or for other reasons, the application of offensive
estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should not
allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel.
36
An 8-1 majority for the Court went on to find none of these
negative factors present in Parklane, and held the "contemporary
law" of collateral estoppel led "inescapably" to its application
there.37 The Court's equation of the policy reasons supporting either
28. North Carolina v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 537 F.2d 67 (4th Cir. 1976); Poster Exchange
Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 517 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Piper Aircraft Distrib.
Sys. Antitrust Litigation, 411 F. Supp. 115 (W.D. Mo. 1976); see note 22 supra.
29. 99 S. Ct. 645, 651 (1979).
30. Id at 650-5 1.
31. Id




36. Id In a footnote, Justice Stewart noted that this was the approach of the Restate-
ment, (Second) of Judgments, (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1975) § 88, which states that the present
trend, "'if not the clear weight of recent authority, is to the effect that there is no intrinsic
difference between 'offensive' as distinct from 'defensive' issue preclusion ... ' Reporter's
Note at 99." 99 S. Ct. at 651 n. 16.
37. 99 S. Ct. at 652.
the grant or denial of offensive and defensive collateral estoppel,
however, may have important ramifications. A complex multidis-
trict lawsuit may present a situation in which policy reasons would
preclude the use of defensive collateral estoppel, and denial would
both promote judicial economy and avoid the potential unfairness
the Court alluded to in Parklane.
38
III. Use of the Venue Statute to Permit the Transferee Judge to
Hear a Consolidated Trial on the Merits in Complex
Multidistrict Cases
A. Limitations Inherent in the Section 1404(a) Venue Statute
Since section 1404(a) permits transfer of an action only to a dis-
trict "where it might have been brought,"39 transfer to the most con-
venient forum is often precluded. For example, transfer is denied if
venue would have been improper in the district or division origi-
nally. The restrictive effect of this statute was strengthened by the
Supreme Court in Hoffman v. Blaski,40 in which the Court held that
consent of the defendant was ineffective if an independent right of
plaintiff to file in that district did not exist.4 ' This decision was high-
ly criticized at the time of its rendering,42 but lower courts continue
to follow it.
43
Although the general procedure for a section 1404(a) transfer is
by party motion,44 a court may order a transfer on its own initia-
tive, 45 subject to certain requirements of notice and hearing.' Like-
38. These policy considerations are discussed more fully in Part IV infra.
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1976). See note 8 supra.
40. 363 U.S. 335 (1960).
41. In an opinion by Justice Whittaker, the Court held that the language of§ 1404(a) was
clear and unambiguous:
We do not think the § 1404(a) phrase "where it might have been brought" can be
interpreted to mean, as petitioners theory would require, "where it may now be
rebrought, with the defendants' consent." This Court has said, in a different context,
that § 1404(a) is "unambiguous, direct [and] clear,".., and that "the unequivocal
words of § 1404(a) and the legislative history. . .[establish] that Congress indeed
meant what it said."
363 U.S. at 34243.
42. See Korbel, The Law of Federal Venue and Choice of the Most Convenient Forum, 15
RuTGERs L. REV. 607 (1961); Masington, Venue in the Federal Courts - The Problem of the
Inconvenient Forum, 15 U. MiAMI L. REv. 237 (1961).
43. See, e.g., American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 433 F.2d 1091 (10th Cir. 1970); Shutte v.
Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); Northwest
Animal Hosp., Inc. v. Earnhardt, 452 F. Supp. 191 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Siemens Aktiengesell-
shaft v. Sonotone Corp., 370 F. Supp. 970 (N.D. I1l. 1973).
44. Swindell-Dressler Corp. v. Dumbauld, 308 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1962); see the discussion
in C. WRiGHT, supra note 11, at § 3844.
45. I-T-E Circuit Breaker Co. v. Becker, 343 F.2d 361, 363 (8th Cir. 1965); Goldlawr, Inc.
v. Heiman, 288 F.2d 579 (2d Cir. 1961), rey'don other grounds, 369 U.S. 463 (1962); Watwood
v. Barber, 70 F.R.D. I, 9 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Stanley Works v. Globemaster, Inc., 400 F. Supp.
1325, 1338 (D. Mass. 1975) ("the language of the statute leaves little doubt that it allows trans-
fer on the court's own motion anytime the court determines it is convenient or just for it to do
so"); Janus v. J.M. Barbe Co., 57 F.R.D. 539 (N.D. Ohio 1972); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.
wise, Rule 11 (b) of Rules of the Procedure of the Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation47 provides that a transferee court may order a transfer of
an action on its own initiative:
Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the trans-
feree court shall be remanded to the Panel to the transferor district
for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the
transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C.
§ 1406.48
The limitation inherent in the venue statute makes it less useful
than it might have been, and creates an anomalous problem in the
multidistrict litigation setting.49 Fortunately, the drafters of section
1407 avoided this problem as it concerns pretrial transfers.
B. Problems of Jurisdiction and Power Under Section 1407
The Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. section 1407, which created the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation in 1968, in response to an
increasing burden upon the federal judiciary over the previous
twenty-five years.5" The statute authorizes the transfer of "civil ac-
tions involving one or more common questions of fact. . . pending
in different districts" to a single district for consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings." Unlike the section 1404(a) venue statute, section 1407
does not limit transfer for pretrial proceedings to a place "where the
action might have been brought." The Panel, in choosing a proper
forum, is authorized to consider the convenience of witnesses, par-
ties, and the object of promoting "just and efficient conduct of such
actions."52
The original purpose of the statute was to permit consolidation
of civil actions for pretrial proceedings only. As a practical matter,
however, the result has often been consolidation of the transferred
cases for trial on the merits. Although this practice is presently sanc-
Cincinnati Milling Mach. Co., 254 F. Supp. 130 (N.D. Ill. 1966); See also C. WRIGHT, supra
note 11, at § 3844.
46. Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 934 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Plum Tree, Inc. v. Stock-
ment, 488 F.2d 754, 756 (3d Cir. 1973); Fine v. McGuire, 433 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1970); C.
WRIGHT, supra note 11, at § 3844.
47. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 11, effective Au-
gust 1, 1978 (found at 78 F.R.D. 561 (1978)).
48. Id 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1976) states in pertinent part,
§ 1406 Cure or Waiver of Defects
(a) The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the
wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer
such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.
(b) Nothing in this chapter shall impair the jurisdiction of a district court of any
matter involving a party who does not interpose timely and sufficient objection to the
venue.
49. See Part l1l(B) infra.
50. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at § 3861, which traces the prehistory of the Panel,
and the promulgation of § 1407. A brief history is also found in Calm, A Look at the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D. 211 (1976).
51. See note 6 supra
52. Id
tioned by the Rules ofProcedure of the Panel,53 this was not always
the case. It was believed that section 1407 precluded a section
1404(a) transfer for consolidated trial on the merits because the stat-
ute required remand of the cases at the close of the pretrial proce-
dures. As one commentator suggested, "[U]nless Congress rewords
the provision, the general pretrial powers of the transferee court will
probably be limited by the absence of the ability to transfer. '5 4 Nev-
ertheless, Judge Lord held otherwise in an excellent opinion in
which he concluded that section 1407 limited only the power of the
Panel and not the transferee judge:
Thus, if the trans/eree judge cannot make a Section 1404(a), or an
even more critical Section 1406(a) transfer, no court can and both
Sections 1404(a) and 1406(a) will have been temporarily sus-
pended by Section 1407. That surely cannot have been the intent
of Congress.55
Indeed, language in the Committee Report of the House Bill indi-
cated that a section 1404(a) transfer was at least contemplated,5 6 and
it is now a well-accepted principle often endorsed and encouraged by
the Panel.57
In many instances section 1407 transfers have been made to for-
ums where the cases could be more easily consolidated for trial.5" A
good example of this was the original transfer by the Panel in In re
Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 9 in which strong policy
53. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
54. Note, Consolidation of Pretrial Proceedings Under Proposed Section 1407 ofthe Judi-
cial Code.- Unanswered Questions of Transfer and Review, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 558, 562 (1966).
55. In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
56. In the Sectional Analysis of H.R. 1130 the House Committee states, "Of course, 28
U.S.C. 1404, providing for change of venue generally, is available in those instances where
transfer of a case for all purposes is desirable." H.R. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1902.
57. The increasing role of the Panel and its evolving practice of transferring cases under
§ 1407 to forums appropriate for trial is discussed in Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct
of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1023 (1974).
58. See, e.g., In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 341 F. Supp. 376
(J.P.M.D.L. 1972); In re Silver Bridge Disaster Litigation, 311 F. Supp. 1345 (J.P.M.D.L.
1970); In re Mid-Air Collision near Fairland, Ind., 309 F. Supp. 621, 623 n.6 (J.P.M.D.L.
1970); In re Koratron Patent Litigation, 302 F. Supp. 239, 242 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969); In re Grain
Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (J.P.M.D.L. 1969), discussed in Note, The Judicial Panel
and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1001, 1023-24 (1974).
The Panel stated in In re Master Key, 320 F. Supp. 1404, 1406 (J.P.M.D.L. 1971) that
"[wihere transfer under § 1407 is preceded by transfer of some cases under 1404(a), the district
selected by the transferor judge or judges and the reasons given therefor are entitled to great
weight in selecting the most appropriate district for the transfer of the remaining actions under
§ 1407." See generally Judge Lord's learned discussion in In re Antibiotic Antitrust Action,
333 F. Supp. 299, 306 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Note, Consolidation and Transfer in the Federal Courts,
28 U.S. C Section 1404(a), 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1289 (1971); Comment, A Survey of Federal lul-
tidirtrict Litigation - 28 U.S. C. § 1407, 15 U. VILL. L. REV. 916, 925-26 (1969).
59. 341 F. Supp. 376 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972). This case has a fascinating procedural history.
See In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 541 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977); In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 498 F.2d 271 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1057 (1974). The procedural aspects of the case are discussed
further at notes 101 &103 infra.
reasons mitigated for transfer to the Eastern District of New York,
yet a 4-3 majority of the Panel transferred the cases to the Southern
District of Florida. Central to the majority's reasoning was "that
Sections 1404(a) and 1407 may be used together to achieve the just
and efficient processing of litigation."' The majority of the Panel
was "convinced that of the two proposed districts, the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida is better suited to pretrial and ultimate trial of the
principal issues involved in the litigation."'" The Panel concluded
that in light "of the doctrine of collateral estoppel applicable in pat-
ent validity actions (under Blonder-Tongue. . .), it is peculiarly de-
sirable that in such multidistrict patent litigation the transfer under
[section] 1407 for pretrial proceedings be made to a district in which
full pretrial and trial [proceedings] .. .can be completed . *"62
C. The Advisability of § 1404(a) Transfers in Multidistrict Cases
Certain considerations may strongly mitigate against a section
1407 judge transferring the case to himself for adjudication on the
merits. It has been argued that transferee courts apply different
standards on a section 1404(a) motion than do original courts, "fre-
quently subordinating notions of party and witness convenience to
considerations of judicial economy."63 As a result, the section
1404(a) policy of advancing party and witness convenience will have
little value when weighed against the section 1407 policy concern of
judicial economy.'
It has also been stated that if consolidation for trial is an advisa-
60. 341 F. Supp. at 381.
61. Id at 382.
62. Id at 383 (citation omitted). The majority recognized that certain of the actions were
not transferrable to the Southern District of Florida under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). "Nevertheless,
all issues raised in these suits, as well as many of the parties, are present in other actions and
can be conclusively determined by pretrial and trial in Florida." 341 F. Supp. at 382 n.15.
The three dissenters argued that because of the convenience of parties and attorneys, as
well as the extensive discovery already carried out, New York was the desirable forum. Id at
387. The dissenters noted, however, that § 1404(a) considerations were also important in
choosing New York as a forum. Id at 388. "If New York is a convenient district for Leesona
for arbitration regardless of where the other disputants are located and also for a Section
1404(a) transfer, it certainly is convenient for pretrial purposes of this action."
63. Levy, Complex and MultidYitrct Litigation and the Federal Courts, 40 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 41, 63 (1971). This issue is discussed thoroughly in C. WaIcurr, supra note 11, at § 3867.
64. See, ag., In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), in
which Judge Lord stated,
The court is not considering the transfer of one case from one district to another, but
rather the transfer and consolidation of 32 cases filed in twelve districts into one
district for trial. Thus, instead of looking to the individual convenience of each party
and each witness, the court must look to the overall convenience of all parties and all
witnesses.
Id at 304. See also Levy, supra note 63, wherein the author states,
Since the transfers involved multiple cases, the rights, interests and convenience of
the individual parties were swept aside in the drive toward apparent judicial econ-
omy. While there may be merit in effecting consolidation of some cases for determi-
nation of liability, it is regrettable that this has been done by sacrificing the rights of
the individual parties and through judicial rewriting of section 1407.
ble practice, borne out by the history and experience of complex
cases, then the statute itself should be amended to reflect this.65
Professors Wright and Miller find "some merit to the argument that
until that has been done the power of the transferee court should be
limited to those matters that clearly fall within the language of, as
well as the original policies underlying, [section] 1407." 66
Finally, it has been suggested that section 1404(a) transfers
cause "unnecessary delay and confusion," which are attributable to
"inconsistent handling" of the motions by the transferor judges.67
Nevertheless, stronger reasons can be advanced in support of
the practice of using section 1404(a) to consolidate section 1407 cases
before the transferee judge for all purposes. Most multidistrict cases
involve complex problems, such as patent or antitrust matters,68 in
which the transferee judge, because of his pretrial management, has
acquired a desirable expertise. 69  Aside from the obvious judicial
65. Id at 65. See notes 53-57 and accompanying text supra,
66. C. WRIGHT, supra note i1, at § 3866.
67. Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct ofMultidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. RPv.
1001, 1019-1021 (1974).
68. In an informal survey based on the Appendix of the Manualfor Complex Litigation,














Manualfor Complex Litigation (1977 ed.). The significance of the manual is discussed in C.
wRIGHT, supra note 11, at § 3868. See alro Comment, Observations on the Manualfor Complex
and Mutitrict Litigation, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 303 (1969).
This complexity factor in patent cases was discussed by the Court in Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313, 330-32 (1971).
69. Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1971). The Second Circuit refused to set
aside Judge Lord's § 1404(a) transfer of all the actions before him to Minnesota. The Panel
had transferred the cases to the Southern District of New York for consolidated pretrial pro-
ceedings pursuant to § 1407. After the majority of cases was settled, Judge Lord was desig-
nated by Chief Justice Burger, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 292, which provides,
The Chief Justice of the United States may designate and assign temporarily a dis-
trict judge of one circuit for service in another circuit, either in a district court or
court of appeals, upon presentation of a certificate of necessity by the chief judge or
circuit judge of the circuit wherein the need arises.
The non-settling cases were then assigned to Judge Lord under § 1407(b). In denying the
petition for rehearing on denial of a writ of mandamus the Second Circuit stated,
He [Judge Lord] also indicated that he felt because of the complexity of these cases
the interests of judicial efficiency make it highly desirable that the judge who con-
ducted the pretrial proceedings continue as trial judge, and that it would be impossi-
ble for him to remain in the Southern District of New York for the length of time
these trials were expected to take.... Judge Lord's solution appears fully justified
under the circumstances.
447 F.2d at 125.
economy reasons for consolidating the trial on the merits, there is
also the problem of inconsistent decisions in cases in which defensive
collateral estoppel may not be applied.7" Consolidation for all pur-
poses avoids this problem and thus promotes "'just and efficient
conduct' of the actions transferred."
71
Moreover, moving for a section 1404(a) transfer while a section
1407 transfer is impending has the potential of causing great confu-
sion through the "inconsistent handling" of the section 1404(a) mo-
tions by transferor judges. This situation should be avoided or a
tremendous waste of judicial resources may occur. Parties should
refrain from making a section 1404(a) motion under these circum-
stances particularly in light of the district courts' inclination to rule
on section 1404(a) motions without regard to pending section 1407
motions before the Panel.72
Since section 1407 does not require the transferee judge to be
located in a place where all the cases might have been brought,73 the
transferee judge may not always be able to transfer the action to
himself for trial on the merits. When he is not in a district where
proper venue lies for all cases, there is a possible alternative to a
section 1404(a) transfer. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 292, 4 a trans-
feree judge could be assigned to a district where venue is proper.
Although transfer by the Panel to such a judge may not be common
practice,75 the solution is viable and is especially preferable when the
designated judge has acquired expertise in handling the litigation.
The major problem with either the transferee judge transferring
the case to himself or the Panel transfering the case to a designated
judge is that transfer is still limited to a forum where all the cases
could have originally been brought. It has been suggested that if no
single forum can be found, it would be preferable to transfer all the
cases to a limited number of districts for coordinated pretrial and
70. The court in In re Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 333 F. Supp. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1971),
indirectly recognized this problem.
The defendants have consistently and energetically contended that these cases and
the classes of plaintiffs involved are inherently unmanageable. The court has already
held that the class actions may be managed and it now notes that these complex,
overlapping and sometimes conflicting cases can be effectively tried only if they are
transferred to one court and one judge. Attempting to try these cases in any other
manner would be like trying to assemble a jigsaw puzzle with some pieces missing.
Id at 305-06. See also In re Suess Patent Infringement Litigation, 331 F. Supp. 549, 550
(J.P.M.D.L. 1971).
71. H.R. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 11968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 1898, 1901. See Speyer, Multidistrict Litigation in Air Crash Cases, CASE & COMMENT
(July-Aug. 1974).
72. See Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L.
Rav. 1001, 1017 (1974), which discusses this inclination and its ramifications in greater detail.
73. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
74. (1976) See note 69 supra
75. Recently, the Panel has had a tendency to transfer under § 1407 to a judge in a juris-
diction where a § 1404(a) transfer is appropriate. See Part Ill(B), supra.
trial proceedings.76 This procedure may have insurmountable short-
comings if the parties do not cooperate in the effort."
Returning to a model one plaintiff-multiple defendant case, if a
patent holder sues all the potential infringers on his patent, it is pos-
sible that no proper forum for all cases may be found to litigate the
common issues. The patent infringers are likely to oppose consolida-
tion on the merits since under the recent trend in collateral estoppel
decisions, they may adopt a "wait and see" approach. Meanwhile, if
the patent holder wins, he would be denied the use of collateral es-
toppel because of due process considerations. Such piecemeal deci-
sion-making advances neither the policies behind the use of
collateral estoppel, nor the need for consolidation in some complex
litigation situations. An application of the principles expressed in
the Parklane decision may be the key to avoiding this difficult prob-
lem in the future.
IV. Policy Considerations for Denying the Use of the Collateral
Estoppel Defense in Certain Complex Multidistrict
Cases
A. Proposed Limitations on the Abandonment of the Mutuality
Doctrine
Justice Traynor's language in Bernhard aside,7" the foregoing
discussion indicates that there should be some limitations placed on
the erosion of the mutuality doctrine. While partial abrogation of
the doctrine is certainly justified, "in certain instances the element of
fairness seems clear in not allowing the potential litigant to sit on the
sidelines in the first action knowing he can reap the fruits of victory
without taking the consequences of defeat."79
These "elements of fairness" and considerations of judicial
economy run through the Court's analysis in both Blonder-Tongue8 °
and Parklan e. s The Court's citation to the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, which generally equates offensive and defensive collat-
eral estoppel,8 2 underlines the necessity of analyzing defensive col-
lateral estoppel under the same format that the Court in Parklane
76. Manualfor Complex Litigation (1977 ed.) § 5.22.
77. The problem arises if parties request separate hearings in each district in which the
cases are pending. Federal Rule 77(b) provides in part "No hearing, other than one exparte,
shall be conducted outside the district without the consent of all parties affected thereby."
Rule 77(b), F.R.C.P.
78. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text supra,
79. Semmel, Collateral Estoppel, Mutuality and Joinder of Parties, 68 COLUM. L. REV.
1457 (1968).
80. See 402 U.S. at 323, and the discussion at notes 20-28 and accompanying text supra.
81. See 99 S. Ct. at 651-56 and the discussion at notes 29-38 and accompanying text
supra,
82. 99 S. Ct. at 651 n.16.
used to analyze the policies for applying offensive -collateral estop-
pel.s3 Professor Semmel's suggestion with regard to the mutuality
requirement is appropriate for both offensive and defensive collat-
eral estoppel:
Abandonment of mutuality alone is a half-hearted step toward ju-
dicial economy. It may actually detract from what is certainly the
most desirable end result, the adjudication in one lawsuit of all
disputes concerning the rights and obligations of all persons who
have a judicially recognized interest in the transaction giving rise
to the litigation.
84
What both the Court and Professor Semmel have recognized is
that allowing non-parties to an action to wait to see whether a com-
mon opponent loses in the present litigation, with the hope of defen-
sively asserting collateral estoppel in a subsequent action, has a
profoundly negative effect on the important principles of judicial
economy and fairness. Thus, in his Proposed Rule 2, Professor Sem-
mel would not allow a non-party to assert collateral estoppel in a
subsequent action if he could have consolidated in the first action. 5
This rule would do away with the gaming approach that otherwise
prevails, and would give greater predictability to the application of
the law. Additionally, although the Proposed Rule might sometimes
make a non-party accept an inconvenient forum, it would "not take
the choice away from the plaintiff; [it would] merely prevent him
from having his cake (choice of forum or parties) and eating it as
well (use of judgment in another action to which he has chosen not
to be a party for tactical reasons). '' 6
B. Application of the Mutuality Doctrine in Multidistrict Litigation
In the complex multidistrict litigation setting, there are strong
policy reasons why a court should not allow the defense of collateral
estoppel to be used in a case where a section 1404(a) transfer would
be desirable, but no proper forum exists to which all the cases could
be transferred. Permitting defendants in a one plaintiff-multiple de-
83. See Part IV(B) infra
84. Semmel, supra note 79, at 1472. Indeed, the Court in Farklane stated that this "wait
and see" attitude would cause an increase in litigation and may be unfair in certain circum-
stances. 99 S. CL at 649.
85. Rule 2
[A] person not a party to a lawsuit (Action 1) but (a) who may have become a party
thereto but failed- to attempt to do so or (b) who may have consolidated an action in
which he was a party with Action I but failed to attempt to do so or (c) who became
party on his own initiative to an action commenced after trial or final disposition of
Action I on a claim arising prior to the trial or disposition thereof and such second
action might have been consolidated with Action I had it been commenced prior to
the trial or disposition of Action 1, may not assert any judgment in the first action
against any party to both the actions if such non-party knew or had reason to know
of the existence of Action 1.
Semmel, supra note 79, at 1475.
86. Id at 1479.
fendant case to "wait and see" is contrary to the policy reasons that
support the section 1404(a) transfer, 7 and frustrates the principles
the Court in Parklane saw as central to the use of the collateral es-
toppel doctrine.
The Court in Parklane focused first on the need to preclude
plaintiffs from litigating identical issues twice, and from adopting a
"'wait and see attitude'" in the hope that the first action will result
in a favorable judgment."' Ideally, use of the defensive collateral
estoppel doctrine tends to lessen litigation. 9 In a multidistrict case
in which a section 1404(a) transfer is improper, a court allowing de-
fensive use of the doctrine is actually encouraging the defendants to
"wait and see." Even though consolidation for trial is preferable,
defendants will "sit on the sidelines" rather than joining the litiga-
tion by filing declaratory judgment actions that would permit one
court to dispose of all the cases. This not only undermines the strong
policies of reduction of litigation and judicial economy cited by the
Parkiane Court, but also frustrates the policy reasons that support
the section 1407 judge hearing certain complex multidistrict cases on
the merits.9' By adopting a policy that refuses to allow defensive
collateral estoppel when mutuality is lacking and consolidation is
preferable, a court would help implement the judicial economy pol-
icy central to both doctrines.9
A further consideration that mitigates against allowing collat-
eral estoppel in such a situation is that it would be unfair to allow the
waiting non-party to adopt a gaming approach to litigation, and it
would not "'promote the just and efficient conduct' of the actions
transferred" contemplated by the passage of section 1407.92
Finally, there is the equally important concern of potentially in-
consistent decisions. Both the use of collateral estoppel and the poli-
cies underlying section 1407 contemplate the elimination of
inconsistency.93 Allowing defensive use of collateral estoppel by a
non-party in one plaintiff-multiple defendant complex litigation in-
creases the potential for inconsistency, since the non-parties may
take advantage of collateral estoppel if the litigation terminates fa-
87. See Part Ill(C) supra
88. 99 S. Ct. at 651.
89. Id
90. These reasons include the ability "to try the cases effectively and expeditiously," C.
WRIGHT, supra note 1I, at § 3866, and the desirability of having a trial judge with expertise
controlling the complex action, see notes 68-70 and accompanying text supra
91. See Note, The Jud&cial Panel and the Conduct of Multidstrict LItigation, 87 HARV. L.
REv. 1001, 1021 (1974), notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra; and Part III(B) supra.
92. H.R. No. 1130,90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 119681 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1898, 1901.
93. In Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464, 470 (1957) Justice Harlan, speaking for the
Court, stated, "As an aspect of the broader doctrine of rer juicalta, collateral estoppel is
designed to eliminate the expense, vexation, waste, and possible inconsistent results ofrdupfi-
catory litigation." See notes 71-72 and accompanying text supra
vorably, but may relitigate the question if the opposition prevails in
the action in which they have not joined.
As discussed above, 94 requiring parties to consolidate in the first
action in order to take advantage of collateral estoppel may have the
effect of causing parties to litigate in inconvenient forums. Yet, an
approach that puts both parties on equal footing is preferable to one
that allows a non-party two or more bites at the same apple. Non-
parties would still be free not to join in the action, but under this
approach, they would not benefit from their reluctance at the ex-
pense of participating parties.
C Some Procedural Considerations
Presumably, under section 1407 a transferee judge has control
over all pretrial proceedings. 95 An order striking or denying the use
of an affirmative defense such as collateral estoppel would appear to
be within the power of the transferee court.96 Indeed, it is preferable
for the transferee judge to make such a ruling, for he is in the best
position to determine the fairness of such a limitation.97 In addition,
a ruling by the transferee judge will alleviate any uncertainty or in-
consistency that may arise if decisions are made by the various trans-
feror courts on remand.98 Notice and a hearing should be given to
the affected non-parties.99 Then, if it is found necessary, a preclu-
sion order should be entered promptly,' 1 which will allow the non-
parties quickly to join in the action if they so choose, and avoid un-
necessary prejudice.
94. See notes 85-86 and accompanying text supra.
95. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484 (J.P.M.D.L. 1968). Here, the Panel
clearly stated that the transferee court had co-extensive power with that of the transferor court.
Id at 496. "[Tihe transferee court may make any order to render any judgment that might
have been rendered by the transferor court in the absence of transfer." Id at 495. See also
Levy, supra note 63, at 58.
96. Cf. In re CBS Licensing Antitrust Litigation, 1971 Trade Cas 73,447 at 89,847
(J.P.M.D.L. 1971); Allegheny Airlines Inc. v. LeMay, 448 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir.), cer. denied, 404
U.S. 1001 (1971), discussed in Levy, supra note 63, at 61 n.121.
97. Semmel, supra note 79, at 1478.
98. The confusion and possible inconsistency of encouraging the varying transferor
courts to make such a ruling on remand is self-evident.
99. Semmel, supra note 79, at 1478.
100. Such a procedure was recently utilized in the complex antitrust action In re Yarn
Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472 F. Supp. 180 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979). The Honorable C.
Clyde Atkins, Chief Judge of the Southern District of Florida, sitting as a §1407 transferee
judge, entered a preclusion order against several alleged patent infringers. Several other de-
fendants had filed declaratory judgment actions before Judge Atkins, but because of the
§ 1404(a) transfer problem discussed in this article, the court could not properly consolidate all
the potential infringers in one trial on the issue of purgation of the patent misuse found by the
Fifth Circuit. Citing the basic policy reasons underlying the use of collateral estoppel and the
§ 1404(a) transfer provisions, Judge Atkins ruled that the defense of collateral estoppel could
not be asserted by the potential infringers who refused either to file declaratory actions before
him, or to be bound by the result of the trial after the cases were remanded. Consequently,
several of the defendants stipulated that they would be bound by the result of the trial on the
issue whether the patent misuse should be purged.
If this procedure is found to be inappropriate by a transferee
judge, a court could effectively withhold remand and achieve a simi-
lar result. While the Panel alone has the power to remand under
section 1407(a),' it has frequently shown great deference to the
transferee judge's recommendation.' 0 2 By recommending that re-
mand be withheld, both the parties and the transferor judge will be
aware that, in the transferee judge's opinion, this is an instance when
collateral estoppel is not a proper defense. This procedure may
thereby facilitate the filing of declaratory judgment actions 0 3 by
non-parties when venue is proper before the transferee judge.
If venue is not proper for filing declaratory actions before the
transferee judge in his home district, it is suggested that the actions
should be filed in a district where proper venue lies, and a 28 U.S.C.
section 292 t° appointment be used to facilitate the same result. If
and when the Panel remands the cases thereafter, the transferor
court should defer to the transferee court's ruling or finding of the
inappropriateness of the collateral estoppel defense. This has been
the general practice of the transferor courts in multidistrict litigation
cases,' 0 5 and has been condoned by the Panel.
10 6
Finally, these procedures seem appropriate in light of the
Panel's policy of transferring cases under section 1407 to a district
appropriate for a section 1404(a) transfer; 0 7 in the more than ten
years of the Panel's existence, nearly ninety-five percent of the sec-
tion 1407 actions have been terminated in the transferee court in
some manner.'0 8 On more than one occasion, the Panel has specifi-
cally mentioned the significance of collateral estoppel considerations
101. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, R. 11.
102. In re Evergreen Valley Project Litigation, 435 F. Supp. 923 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977); In re
IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 254 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976); In re
Franklin Nat'l Bank Secs. Litigation, 407 F. Supp. 248 (J.P.M.D.L. 1976); In re Multidistrict
Civil Actions Involving the Air Crash Disaster Near Dayton, Ohio, 386 F. Supp. 908
(J.P.M.D.L. 1967).
103. This was the procedure used in In re Yarn Processing Patent Validity Litigation, 472
F. Supp. 180 (J.P.M.D.L. 1979), discussed at note 100, supra. Even though there is another
adequate remedy or another pending suit, use of a declaratory judgment is not barred. The
test is one of effectiveness and efficiency, and is largely within the court's discretion. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2201, 2202 (1976); Rule 57 F.R.C.P. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, 10 FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 275 (1973). The non-participants may also choose to stipulate to the
result, rather than to afford the expense of additional litigation. This allows the same benefits
in many cases as the declaratory actions.
104. See note 69 supra, and notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
105. Levy, supra note 63, at 58; cf. In re Penn Central Secs. Litigation, 62 F.R.D. 181, 187
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (transferee judge should avoid conflict by requiring parties to comply with
previous orders of the transferor judge).
106. In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Secs. Litigation, 393 F. Supp. 1093 (J.P.M.D.L. 1975).
This point is discussed extensively in C. WRIGHT, supra note 11, at § 3866.
107. See the discussion at notes 58-62 and accompanying text supra.
108. Note, The Judicial Panel and the Conduct of/Multidistrict Litigation, 87 HARV. L. REV.
1001, 1017 n.78 (1974); Cahn, 4 Look at the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72
F.R.D. 211 (1976).
under Blonder-Tongue. '09 In one case,1 0 for example, where a pat-
ent holder sought to relitigate the validity of his patent after it had
already been declared invalid in a previous proceeding, the Panel
transferred the cases to a judge who did not have any of the actions
presently before him. The Panel reasoned that only this judge could
"conclusively determine the patent validity and collateral estoppel
issue,""' as well as eliminate "duplicative proceedings and the risk
of inconsistent decisions."" 1
2
V. Conclusion
The Parklane case, by implication, has a great effect on the doc-
trine of defensive collateral estoppel in multidistrict litigation. The
policy reasons presented by the Supreme Court give a strong basis
for either a transferee or transferor court to deny the use of collateral
estoppel when consolidation is preferable and no section 1404(a)
transfer is possible to a forum where all the cases "might have been
brought." A court must use its discretion wisely in deciding if con-
solidation on the merits is preferable. Nevertheless, in those cases in
which a judge would normally transfer the cases to himself, and
proper venue is lacking, collateral estoppel should be denied defend-
ants in order to encourage the filing of declaratory actions.
Permitting defendants to "wait and see" undermines the policy
reasons of judicial economy and fair and consistent results that un-
derlie both the argument for section 1404(a) transfer by section 1407
judges to themselves, and the doctrine of collateral estoppel. That
Congress has been delinquent in amending section 1407 should not
be sufficient to restrain a court from using this device to achieve
speedy and efficient disposition of complex multidistrict litigation.
109. See In re Yarn Processing Patent Litigation, 341 F. Supp. 376 (J.P.M.D.L. 1972),
discussed at notes 58-2 and accompanying text supra; In re Suess Patent Infringement Litiga-
tion, 331 F. Supp. 549 (J.P.M.D.L. 1971).
110. In re Suess Patent Infringement Litigation, 331 F. Supp. 549 (J.P.M.D.L. 1971).
!11. Id at 550.
112. Id.
